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With the increasing artificial intelligence application, deep neural network (DNN) has become an emerging task. However, to
train a good deep learning model will suffer from enormous computation cost and energy consumption. Recently, blockchain has
been widely used, and during its operation, a huge amount of computation resources are wasted for the Proof of Work (PoW)
consensus. In this paper, we propose DLBC to exploit the computation power of miners for deep learning training as proof of useful
work instead of calculating hash values. it distinguishes itself from recent proof of useful work mechanisms by addressing various
limitations of them. Specifically, DLBC handles multiple tasks, larger model and training datasets, and introduces a comprehensive
ranking mechanism that considers tasks difficulty(e.g., model complexity, network burden, data size, queue length). We also applied
DNN-watermark [1] to improve the robustness.
In Section V, the average overhead of digital signature is 1.25, 0.001, 0.002 and 0.98 seconds, respectively, and the average
overhead of network is 3.77, 3.01, 0.37 and 0.41 seconds, respectively. Embedding a watermark takes 3 epochs and removing a
watermark takes 30 epochs. This penalty of removing watermark will prevent attackers from stealing, improving, and resubmitting
DL models from honest miners.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Deep Learning, Proof-of-Useful-Work
I. INTRODUCTION
B ITCOIN [2] is the most popular blockchain technology-based application. Besides countless cryptocurrencies,
blockchain technology has been successfully applied in dif-
ferent fields. However, the traditional Proof-of-Work (PoW)
consensus mechanism demands an immense amount of energy
for computation to maintain the blockchain. According to
Digiconomist [3], the estimated power consumption of Bitcoin
“mining” reaches around 70 TWh per year during the second
half of the year 2018. As a result, there are the concerns and
warnings about energy wasting of cryptocurrencies [4], for
instance, Camilo Mora published a paper in Nature Climate
Change with the title of “Bitcoin emissions alone could push
global warming above 2 centigrade” [5].
To maintain the consistency of transactions, the traditional
Proof of Work (PoW) consensus mechanism utilizes the brute-
force algorithms to host a competition of hardware and energy
source, and this is the major component that leads to the
energy wasting issue. A series of solutions have been proposed
to address this issue, such as ASIC machine [6], Proof of
Stake (PoS) [7], Proof of Capacity (PoC) [8] and Proof of
Useful Work (PoUW) [6]. ASIC machines compute hash
efficiently, but this type of machine is only able to calculate
on a certain type of brute-force algorithms and it is relatively
inflexible. PoC significantly wastes disk space instead of
electricity. PoS mechanism cannot provide solid security as
PoW, because determination of the block creators involves
efficient computation only, and it does not consume much
energy [9]. On contrary, PoUW exploits computation power
of “miners” for useful tasks, therefore the energy consumed
by the miners is not wasted.
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Fig. 1. A blockchain maintained with image Segmentation algorithm as
PoUW.
Deep learning plays a crucial role in many fields, for
instance, supporting clinic diagnosis [10]–[16]. By taking
advantage of rapid increase of computing power and machine
learning research interests [17]–[25] , the performance of deep
learning has been improved significantly.
However, it does require huge computation power to achieve
high performance model [12], [26]. In addition, an accurate
model requires machine learning experts to tune it by training
and evaluating with different hyper-parameters multiple times.
Therefore, a good model comes at the cost of very high
computation consumption.
Primecoin [27], PoX [28], PrivacyPreserving Blockchain
Mining [29], Coin.AI [30], WekaCoin [31], and PoDL [32] are
PoUW mechanisms that ask miners to perform valuable tasks.
This paper proposes a deep learning based consensus (DLBC)
as PoUW, as demonstrated in Fig. 1, to exploit the computation
power of “miners” for training deep learning tasks while
addressing the limitations of existing PoUW mechanisms. This
work solved three challenges: (1) Because the “useful work”
in term of training deep learning model is different from
hash algorithm, the original consensus will not fit our case.
This novel mechanism has to be fair for all miners which
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is challenging. (2) Because the DL models and source code
are accessible to public, it is necessary and challenging to
protect the ownership of all submitted DL models. (3) Because
sustainability of this blockchain depends on whether there are
enough training tasks, we suggested an mechanism to balance
the reward and create incentive for task publisher when the
system needs more tasks to train.
In order to address these challenges, we augmented existing
memory pool of full nodes to keep all unconfirmed tasks and
unselected tasks, a novel task scheduler in each block interval
so that miners will work on the same job, and augmented the
block data structure to keep the current task and unselected
tasks record. To protect the ownership of the DL models, we
leveraged DNN-watermark [1] such that the winner miner can
prove and protect the ownership with the embedded watermark
in the model. Our major contributions are: (1) our mechanism
can accept and handle multiple tasks; (2) similar to the state-
of-the-art consensus mechanisms based on deep learning, our
mechanism can also handle large models and training datasets;
(3) we proposed a difficulty score for each submitted task
that miners will select a training task based on the scores
as the guideline and the mechanism also provide incentive
for task publishers; (4) we adopt the DNN-watermark [1] to
protect submitted DL models and evaluate the reliability of
the embedded watermark method.
As the overhead evaluation shown in Section V indicates,
the average overhead of digital signature is 1.25, 0.001, 0.002
and 0.98 seconds, respectively, and the average overhead of
network is 3.77, 3.01, 0.37 and 0.41 seconds, respectively. In
the watermark evaluation, it demonstrates that embedding a
watermark takes 3 epochs and successful removing a water-
mark takes 30 epochs. The penalty of removing watermark
will prevent attackers steeling, improving, and resubmitting
DL models from honest miners.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Multiple machine learning tasks have adopted deep neural
networks as solutions and achieved state-of-art results.
Application of deep neural networks in image classifica-
tion: Image classification is a classic computer vision task
that has been existing for decades. Classification can be as
simple as recognition of handwritten digits such as MNIST
dataset. On the other hand, complex classification problems
can have thousands of categories involved which sets high
accuracy obstacles even for human [33]. As deep neural
networks triumphed the ImageNet [34] challenge since 2012,
neural networks have been going deeper and deeper, from
AlexNet [35] with 8 layers to as much as ResNet [36] with 152
layers. A Major component of these networks is convolutional
layers with several filters. As a result, the stack of dozens
of convolutional layers usually requires significant amount of
computation power.
Application of deep neural networks in biomedical image
segmentation: Biomedical image segmentation is another task
which has been boosted tremendously by the development
of deep neural networks. The task usually outputs a pixel-
wise classification result in the original size of the high-
resolution input image. Fully convolutional networks (FCN) is
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Fig. 2. 3D U-Net [41]: a widely used framework in fully convolutional
networks for medical image segmentation.
Fig. 3. Hand written digit samples for images classifier tasks (MNIST) [45]
a special category of DNN, which is widely used for medical
image segmentation. Compared with general DNNs, FCNs
only consist of convolutional layers, up convolutional layer,
and pooling layers as shown in Fig. 2. With this characteristic,
FCNs can efficiently output images with the same size as
the input images as shown in Fig. 2. Almost all the DNN-
based methods for 3D image segmentation adopt FCN as the
backbone network structure, and add some special structures
and improve training strategies [13], [37]–[44]. For example,
3D U-Net [38] adds more connections between the first several
layers and the last several layers as shown in Fig. 2 to better
extract features. With all the details implemented in these
convolution operation based deep neural networks and the
large image size in this specific problem (square of thousands
of pixels for single medical image), training for these models
is undoubtedly computationally expensive.
Application of deep neural networks in speech recognition:
Besides the computer vision area, deep neural networks also
dominate the research in speech recognition. Speech recog-
nition aims at translating an input sound wave signal into
matching text output. A common approach used to solve
the problem would be preprocessing the sound wave into a
sequence of slices, then a Recurrent neural network can be
applied to generate a corresponding sequence of characters
recognized from the input sequence. By training the model
with CTC loss, which removes repetition in the output text
sequence, the output text can reach a satisfying accuracy.
Consensus mechanisms for blockchain: Proof of Stake (PoS)
is a consensus mechanism in cryptocurrencies to decide the
creator of the next block based on the amount of cryptocur-
rencies the creator owns or other weights that can prove the
authority of the creator. Determination of the block creators
involves efficient computation only, and it does not consume
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Fig. 4. Single word command audio sample for automatic speech recognition
tasks [46]
much energy. However, it is unknown whether PoS mechanism
is a robust distributed consensus mechanism owing to various
limitations [47]–[49]. Existing cryptocurrencies adopting PoS
all have extra rules to make the consensus mechanism more
robust, however, the necessity of extra rules implies the PoS
is inherently unstable, and the benefit of energy efficiency is
diluted.
Proof of Work (PoW) does not suffer from the instability of
PoS. Its stability is supported by the enormous computation
resources contributed to hard computation problems, and its
criticism has been on its large amount of wasted energy. The
idea of PoW was proposed to prevent from the denial-of-
service attacking [50]. In PoW consensus, all participants are
required to solve problems before they send messages. Such
problems are challenging to solve and easy to validate. In
Bitcoin, miner nodes are required to calculate hash values as
PoW.
Proof-of-Deep-Learning (PoDL) In this paper, we inherit the
block acceptance policy of PoDL [32], [51] to substitute the
hash calculation with segmentation model training. We briefly
explain the mechanism before introducing our novel protocols
that addresses PoDL’s limitations.
Each block interval is divided into two phases, Phase 1
and Phase 2. At the beginning of Phase 1, a task publisher
releases the training dataset (with labels) as well as the
hyperparameters of the deep learning model to miners and full
nodes. During Phase 1, miners train their own deep learning
model, and commit their model by the end of Phase 1. The
commit process is completed through submitting the hash of
their trained models as well as their IDs. At the beginning
of Phase 2, the task publisher releases the test dataset to
miners and full nodes, and each miner submits (1) the block
header and the block that contains information describing the
trained model on top of existing attributes, (2) the trained
model, and (3) the accuracy of the trained model, to full nodes.
Note that the hash of the block header does not need to be
smaller than the threshold because the hard computation is
replaced with the model training. Full nodes, during Phase
2, validate the submitted models to check whether they have
the claimed accuracy, and this happens on top of existing
validation in the blockchain (e.g., validation of the correctness
of transactions, Merkle tree, hash). To avoid miners over-fitting
their models on the disclosed test dataset or stealing others
models (published during Phase 2), full nodes discard any
block whose model was not committed during Phase 1 (i.e.,
hash of the model or ID have not been received in Phase 1).
Full nodes will accept the block that is submitted with the
highest-accuracy model that claimed its accuracy correctly.
They choose and validate the models in decreasing order
of the claimed accuracy for that. Such a block acceptance
policy yields a robust consensus and is secure against double-
spending attack as long as no more than 51% of computation
power is owned by the attackers. However, the PoDL is limited
in that they can only handle one task at once, and there is
insufficient details about how to handle training model.
To address these drawbacks, we present an alternative PoW
mechanism that asks miners to perform biomedical image
segmentation tasks and present a trained segmentation model
as the proof. The major contributions of this paper are:
(1) our blockchain allows submissions of multiple tasks, (2)
our blockchain can handle large models with large training
datasets. These contributions are significant since they make
the idea of Proof-of-Useful-Work behind the PoDL more
practical and applicable in the real world by supporting
multiple tasks and larger predictive models, (3) our blockchain
suggested a sustainable task scheduling mechanism which
provides incentive for task publishers, thus the system will
be sustainable.
There exists other consensus mechanisms based on deep
learning as well. PrivacyPreserving Blockchain Mining [29]
proposed a Sybil-resistance scheme based on privacy-
preserving machine learning as PoUW consensus. In their de-
sign, they applied the hybrid consensus protocols [52] which
dynamically selects flexible amount of full nodes as committee
members and the participants include data providers, miners,
the committee and non-committee nodes. In addition, Privacy-
Preserving Blockchain Mining [29] introduced their two
parallel chains that long-interval for useful work and short-
interval for transaction. In the simulation, they especially
evaluated the submission conflict scenario. Coin.AI [30] in-
troduced a frame which requires miners to train DL models
as PoUW and a proof-of-storage scheme for rewarding users.
WekaCoin [31] presented a new distributed consensus protocol
which alleviates the computational waste in PoW brute-force
algorithms and creates a public distributed and verifiable
database of DL models.
All three related works address the first challenge which
supports miners to perform DL training as PoUW. PrivacyPre-
serving Blockchain Mining and WekaCoin may not address the
seconnd challenge where an attacker could steal and improve
the pre-trained model which submitted from honest miner,
and submit improved model before the block is conformed.
The Coin.AI addressed the second challenge which required
miners to train deep learning models with hyperparameter
achieved from the hash value of the previous block. With a pre-
fixed hypermarameter, attackers will have less opportunities to
improve the honest miner’s DL model. Here, DLBC applied
embedded watermark in the DL model, therefore, the honest
miner can claim the ownership of a model and full nodes will
detect the DL model from attackers.
In general, all three related works described similar partic-
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ipants with different names. They all give sufficient incentive
for miners. But, it is also important to collect tasks for miners
to train and all three related works did not provide a proper
strategy to encourage task publishers when the system needs
more training task. In DLBC, we introduced an algorithm to
provide reward for task publishers when the task queue is
relative short. In addition, we introduced ranking score which
considered the training difficult, data size, model size, network,
and task queue.
Other Proof-of-Useful-Work mechanisms: Primecoin [27]
is an altcoin that asks the miners to find a special sequence
of prime numbers (Cunningham chain) instead. Although
the outcome of miners’ computation has mathematical and
research meaning, i.e., discovering the Cunningham chain. The
application of Cunningham chain in the real world is unclear.
Proof of Exercise (PoX) is a design proposed in [28],
which is another PoUW mechanism that lets miners perform
certain exercises and present the outcome as a proof. In PoX,
employers publish their tasks onto a board and the miners
will randomly fetch tasks from it. The limitation of PoX is
that they rely on this centralized board maintained by a third
party, which significantly dilutes the decentralization property
of the blockchain.
There are similar but orthogonal approaches as well. Hybird
Mining [53] and Conquering Generals [54] described a similar
mechanism which solves NP-complete problem [55] as the
proof in their PoUW consensus. Proof-of-Search [56] ad-
dresses the energy waste issue in PoW by solving optimization
problems as PoUW.
III. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we define the entities involved in our
blockchain, which will be used to support DL training as
PoUW.
A. Participants
Miners are the machines of individual or small organizations
who wish to contribute their computation power for maintain-
ing a blockchain and may receive rewards as the exchange.
In our case, we only consider a standard computer (not ASIC
machine) with one or more dedicated graphic cards as a miner,
for instance, the gaming machines and deep learning machines.
Miners train the DL models as PoW with GPUs, maintain
a max heap of submitted tasks based on task rewards and
validate the result of potential block owner.
Full nodes record all blocks and transactions, maintain a
min heap of submitted tasks based on task reward, validate
the submitted tasks and check the checkpoint of miners and
validate the result of potential block owner.
Task publishers release biomedical image segmentation train-
ing tasks and training data. After a training task is selected
and performed by the miners, the corresponding publisher will
pay certain amount of reward to the miner presenting the best
image segmentation model in the form of the cryptocurrency
that is maintained by the blockchain.
B. Assumptions
There are three assumptions that our design relies on. Some
of them hold naturally in existing blockchains while others do
not.
Assumption 1: We assume task publishers’ best interest
is to achieve the image segmentation model with the best
performance. Therefore, we assume no collusion happens
between miners and task publishers, because colluding with
miners (e.g., disclosing test datasets to specific miners) will
degrade the accuracy of the model only. However, it is true
that miners are well motivated to collude with task publishers
(even though task publishers are not motivated to do so) since
winning miners gain block rewards. It is our future work to
achieve a robust consensus mechanism that does not rely on
this assumption.
Besides, we also assume task publishers will pay the task
reward honestly once their tasks are performed by the miners.
However we introduce how to relax this assumption via smart
contract by the end of this paper.
Assumption 2: We assume the training tasks can be inter-
rupted and stopped at any time by the miners. We make this
assumption because training tasks may be complex and time
consuming, but we need to guarantee certain block generation
rate. The gap between the length of training time and the short
block interval will be handled by allowing the miners to stop
the training tasks at any time and submit the saved checkpoint
as their proof of work during the block interval. Note that this
assumption holds for optimization algorithms that are based
on gradient descendent.
Assumption 3: The full nodes’ network condition is stable and
reliable enough such that all full nodes have the same view
on their memory pool and that miners and task publishers
can access such view without significant network delay. In
addition, we assume the full nodes’ clocks are synchronized
up to the difference of 5 seconds. These assumptions are
necessary for achieving security properties in our blockchain.
IV. DESIGN
We propose the DLBC for maintaining a blockchain which
is DL-based consensus. Most of the computation power of
miners will be spent on training DL models instead of cal-
culating useless hash values as in existing PoW mechanisms.
Each new block is generated by the miner who submits the
DL model with the best performance, which will be validated
by the full nodes. Once the model is confirmed to be the best,
the miner will generate the block and receive both of the task
reward and the block reward. The block reward distribution is
suggested by Equations 5,7. The major novelty of this paper is
to overcome the limitation of a prior work that cannot handle
more than one task, large deep learning models and large
training datasets.
A. Ranking Mechanism for Multiple Tasks
As aforementioned challenges about sustainability, it is
important to collect sufficient training tasks from honest
publishers if we can provide rewards when the task list is
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relative short. We introduce the equations which will schedule
DL training tasks based on ranking score.
In Equation 1, qi is the task queue index which will effect
the value of ranking score and block reward distribution. The
value of L and li, must be positive integers, represent the
estimated maximum length and current length of the task
queue, respectively. Here k is the scaling factor. When k is
bigger than one, the threshold (L/k) of the task queue length
will be shorter than K. When k is between zero and one, the
threshold of the task queue will be bigger than K.
qi =
ln (k × li)
lnL
, k > 0 (1)
In Equation 2, 3, the value of dni and dci represent the
hardness of task in terms of transmission over network and
Floating-Point Operations (FLOPs) of model, respectively.
dni =
model size + data size
median network bandwidth
(2)
Block i-1
Unselected
tasks record
Block i
Hash (Previous block header)
Transaction
ledger
Block header
Timestamp
Hash of block data (such as merkle tree)
Model
Training data
Task info
Digital signature 
(The selected and performanced task)
Task
(The selected and
 performanced ) 
>Task info
>Link
time
Block i Block i+1
Fig. 7. An overview of the block i.
dci =
FLOPs
median computation power
(3)
As shown in Equation 4, the ranking score of a task is
based on the task reward, difficulty of the task (dni and dci)
and the task queue index (qi). The Equations 1,2,3,4 will
suggest a ranking list of tasks based on the scores. In the
current design, all miner nodes will train the task with the
smallest ranking score. Thus, the system will prefer a task
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with high task reward, small model size and data size. When
the length of the task queue is shorter than the threshold (L/k),
the system will prefer a complicated task. When the length of
the task queue is longer than the threshold, the system will
prefer a task with less FLOPs.
ranking score =
dni + (dci)
qi
task reward
(4)
For the block reward, the Equations 5,7 suggest the ratio
of block reward distribution that will encourage publishers to
submit DL training tasks by sharing block rewards if the length
of task queue is shorter than the threshold. This design will
try to ensure that the task list will not be empty.
block rewardpublisher = max(0, 1− (k × li
L
)2) (5)
block rewardminer = 1− block rewardpublisher (6)
B. Overview of block mining
In a traditional blockchain, the attributes of the block header,
as shown in Fig 7, include the block number, the hash value
of the previous block header, the hash of the block data, a
timestamp, the size of the block and the nonce value; the
block data part contains a ledger that records transactions [57].
We introduce three new attributes to the block header in
our blockchain: (1) digital signature of segmentation model,
training data, and segmentation task information, (2) the task
that is selected and performed by all miners, (3) the list of all
unfinished tasks that need to be performed in the future. Each
attribute will be explained in the subsequent sections.
In Fig. 5, it shows the scheduling of tasks for block i and
block i+ 1. For each block, the interval is split into three
partitions which named as Phase 1 (P1), Phase 2 (P2) and
Phase 3 (P3), respectively. For block i, it starts at time tia
and ends by t(i+1)a. For each phase in block i, P1 starts at
time tia and ends by tib; P2 starts at time tib and ends by tic;
P3 starts at time tib and ends by t(i+1)a. The periods of P1,
P2 and P3 are fixed where the length of time for P2 is much
longer than those of P1 and P3.
As shown in Fig. 5, the procedure will be introduced in
details. In general, the length of Phase 2 is much longer
than the length of Phase 3, because the training time will be
significantly longer than the testing time. The Phase 1 of block
i starts at time tia. Task publishers can submit DL training
tasks during this phase. The publisher will need to submit its
own ID, reward, and links (model address and data address). In
real world scenarios that memory pool may not hold the same
view of task ranking list due to network delay, it may need an
additional ledger to confirm all submitted tasks and a target
task will be selected from the confirmed list. However, as it
is claimed in Assumption 3, full nodes will hold the same
view on memory pool, thus we will not consider this case
and will address this issue in the future. In the current work,
all submitted tasks will be recorded in the unselected list, as
described in Section IV-D. At the same time, the miners are
training the segmentation task which was ranked at the first
place by the end of the last block. After a task appeared in
the unselected task list, it will join the ranking which is based
on the task reward. Only the task with the highest task reward
will win the chance to be trained.
Once the target training task is confirmed, miner nodes start
fetching data and model, and the publisher of the selected task
will release the key to the encrypted model. After the model
and data are ready, each miner will evaluate the complexity
of the task by training the model for one epoch. Then miners
will start training with GPUs for a certain number of epochs.
The number of epochs was evaluated by each individual miner
and it can be different among miners. This number is measured
to ensure that the miner can stop training before Phase 3, yet
finish the last entire epoch. The behavior of other participators
is described in Sections IV-D,IV-E.
As shown in Fig 5, the primary job of Phase 3 is to test and
validate the biomedical image segmentation model which was
trained during Phase 1 of the current block. When the time
tib (shown in Fig. 5) arrives, the publisher will provide API
for miner nodes to test their own model and for full nodes to
validate the winner model.
Miner nodes generate a digital signature which is shown
as Fig 7 digital signature frame. At the same time, miners
will check the accuracy of their own models. All miners will
submit their accuracy values and model links. In addition,
the model link is required to include all checkpoint models
for verification purpose. This policy is to make sure that
the final model is truly a trained model. The full nodes
will sort all submitted accuracy values and verify the model
with the highest accuracy. The miner, who submitted the
best model, will generate the block. Meanwhile, as described
in Section IV-D, the task ledger will be confirmed which
also means all unconfirmed tasks are moved into unselected
task list. The target task for the next block is selected from
the updated unselected task list, and traditional transaction
confirmation is finished.
The essential property of blockchain is that any full node
should be able to verify the history data. In this case, it
is necessary to check that the accepted biomedical image
segmentation models are trained from training dataset only.
In addition, the testing results must be the same as they were
claimed. As described above, full nodes will be able to fetch
all the checkpoint models as the reference to verify the training
through the model link in the task ledger in block data.
C. DL model ownership protection with DNN-watermark
Once a miner submits a model, it is very important to
protect the ownership. Otherwise, attackers will be able to
steal others submissions to generate seemingly valid blocks
without performing the actual work. For example, an attacker
may attempt to steal a published model and perform short-term
extra training to generate a distinct model. Such an attack will
lead to a valid block since the block and the model are not
bound to each other unlike the hash value and the block in
PoW-based consensus. To prevent such attacks, we adopted
DNN-watermark to protect DL model ownership [1].
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1) Embedding watermarks into deep neural networks
In order to claim and protect the ownership of the deep
learning model, the miner will generate a watermark and
embed the watermark into the deep neural network.
For each individual miner, they will firstly generate a unique
watermark from the current block data which is derived from
the hash of the block body and the block header. We will
apply the direct watermark method as described in the DNN-
watermark [1]. A watermark in this method is a binary matrix
of n columns and m rows. The method requires that each
column of the matrix should contain only one 1 and the rest
are 0s. We will use the first two rows to encode the hash of
the block body and the block header into the matrix, which is
the watermark to be embedded into DL models. The encoding
rule is to check the hash value bit by bit. If the i-th bit of
the hash is 0, the first row of the i-th column is 1 in the
watermark matrix; if the i-th bit of the hash is 1, the second
row of the i-th column is 1 in the watermark matrix. Since
the first transaction (i.e., CoinBase transaction) is unique, the
hash value of the block data and the corresponding watermark
matrix is unique unless there is a hash collision, which can
be neglected since a cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA-256) is
adopted in practice.
The generated watermark is embedded into DL models
via regular DL training methods with an extra term in the
loss function that is optimized during the training (Eq. 7).
E(w) is the total loss function, where E0(w) is the original
loss function related to the classification errors and ER(w)
is the extra regularizer term for embedding the watermark.
Because a watermark-related term is introduced, the value of
weights in the model will be updated to follow the requested
distribution such that the watermark matrix will be embedded
into the weights. This distribution of the weight values can
be easily detected and this will be demonstrated in the ex-
periment section. As described in DNN-watermark [1], the
normal regularizer will address the over-fitting issue and this
additional regularizer will train the weights of model to follow
certain statistical bias.
E(w) = E0(w) + λ× ER(w) (7)
2) Determination of existence of watermark
Once a miner submit a DL model and corresponding wa-
termark which is unique as discussed before, full nodes will
determine whether a watermark matches or not. As introduced
in [1], the watermark extraction is done by projecting DL
model weights using the unique watermark from miner and it
can be considered as a binary classification problem with one
layer. Therefore, we will find one array of confidence level.
In our experiment, we picked 0.9999 as the threshold. Only if
the confidence level of all watermark elements is higher than
0.9999, the miner will be detected as honest miner and model
will be confirmed as matched. Only a DL model submitted by
honest miner could be considered as winner candidacy.
3) Ownership protection
Note that the embedded watermark is generated from the
block which is publicly known, whereas the robustness of the
watermark in the original method [1] relies on the confiden-
tiality of the watermark. Therefore, it is possible to remove
or overwrite the embedded watermark in our scenario. For
example, attackers may attempt to remove the watermark by
subtracting the same extra term in the loss function instead of
adding it and perform the training. By doing so, it is possible
for the attackers to remove the watermark, but it takes many
times more epochs of training to remove it as we show in
the experiments (Section V). It will only need less than 5
iterations of training to embed the watermark in the model, but
attacker miner will need more than 30 iterations of training to
remove the honest miner’s watermark. Therefore, training on
top of others’ models will not help a malicious miner to win
the block reward. In other words, by spending the same amount
of computation, the attackers could achieve better models with
higher accuracy if they train their own models from the scratch
without needing to remove existing watermarks.
In the third phase of each block, all full nodes will validate
submissions which start from the best performance model. A
full node will need to check whether the miner’s watermark is
matching the embedded watermark in the submitted DL model.
In our experiment, only if each elements of the confidence
level is higher than 0.9999, the unique miner’s watermark is
confirmed as matching DL model. If it matches, the model will
be considered as genuine submission. If miner’s watermark
cannot be detected from the submitted model, the miner will
be considered as malicious miner and this submission will be
pruned.
D. Handling multiple tasks
Unlike in [32] where at most one task can be accepted by the
blockchain, our novel blockchain is capable of accepting mul-
tiple tasks and handle them with the aforementioned ranking
mechanism (Section IV-A). We achieve this by augmenting the
full nodes’ mempool to keep all the unselected tasks (Fig 6).
Namely, multiple tasks submitted by publishers will reside in
the mempool until they are selected and performed by the
miners.
We allow task publishers to submit their tasks to full nodes
only during Phase 2. To submit a task, the publisher will need
to broadcast the followings to full nodes: publisher ID, task
reward value, a link for downloading training dataset as well
as the model (i.e., its hyperparameter). At the same time, the
publisher will write and launch the smart contract that will
send the task reward to the winning miner later when the task
is performed and corresponding model is announced in the
blockchain. Once the publisher submits a task, it will go to
the full nodes’ mempool and become an unfinished task. The
unfinished tasks will stay in the mempool until the miners
select and perform them.
With multiple tasks, it becomes important to let miners
agree on the same task to be performed. Otherwise, it is
hard to choose the winner by choosing the highest-accuracy
model, since comparison of accuracy among different tasks is
meaningless. Furthermore, as we will describe in Section IV-F,
attackers may attempt to double spend by creating forks, and
it is necessary to provide a task selection for the miners to
agree on one task for each block.
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Our blockchain defines that all miners must choose the task
with the highest reward from the unfinished tasks in full nodes’
mempool (ties are broken in a pre-defined manner). Due to
the assumption that full nodes’ views on the mempool are
consistent, all full nodes have the same set of tasks in their
mempool, and it is the blockchain policy to choose the task
with the highest reward. Therefore all the miners must select
and perform the same task for a specific block.
E. Handling large models and training data
In order to reduce the network traffic, a task publisher will
only need to submit the model link and dataset link instead of
submitting the model and the dataset directly during the task
submission process. Also, to save the block storage, the link
will be stored in blocks instead of actual models or datasets.
Miners still need to retrieve training data from the publisher,
which may lead to network delay of tens of seconds or even
more. To reduce this time loss, we let task publishers release
the training dataset earlier in Phase 3 of the previous block’s
mining. After Phase 2 for block i, the task to be performed for
block i+1 has been determined already, therefore the miners
can start to download. Note that miners are not able to continue
training in Phase 3. Otherwise, the model will be different
from the one committed in Phase 1. One issue of such training
data release is that the miners with high network bandwidth are
advantaged because they can start mining earlier than others.
To avoid this and make mining fair, we let task publishers
encrypt the training data with any efficient symmetric-key
encryption (e.g., AES [58]) and release the encrypted training
data instead. Then, the publisher releases the key at the end
of Phase 3. By doing so, the network delay caused by a key is
negligible (e.g., ≤ 256 bits for AES), and the miners who have
finished downloading the encrypted training data can decrypt
it and perform the training task immediately. The decryption
causes extra delay as well, but the decryption itself can be
considered as the work that miners need to prove. Note that,
with the Assumption 1 in Section III, the task publisher will
not release the key to any specific miners in advance.
Symmetric-key encryption such as AES does not expand
data, but it is possible that encrypted training data cannot be
fully downloaded within Phase 3 because of the large volume.
Motivated miners will monitor the tasks being submitted to full
nodes and start fetching the training data even before Phase
3, but our mechanism may have to limit the training data to
an acceptable size.
F. Handling forks
Instead of considering the longest chain as the correct one,
we let full nodes in our blockchain consider the chain who
has the most highest-accuracy models as the correct one. The
intuition behind this form of fork resolution is similar to that in
existing cryptocurrencies based on PoW mechanisms. Namely,
generating a correct block with a small-enough hash value is
challenging in PoW-based cryptocurrencies, and a chain will
be considered correct if it has the most correct blocks with
small-enough hash values (i.e., being the longest chain). In our
blockchain, generating a valid block with the highest-accuracy
model is challenging, therefore we treat the chain with the
most highest-accuracy models as the correct one.
G. Validating past blocks
Newly-joined full nodes need to verify the entire
blockchain. When checking block i, full nodes will need to
check the unselected tasks record from block i − 1 and the
selected task for block i to see whether the task selected in
block i has the smallest ranking score. Here, the ranking score
is given by Equation 4. The full nodes will have to verify
whether the model accuracy is the same as the one claimed
by the winner miner. Then, the full node will verify the digital
signature we introduced in the block header to verify the
integrity of data. Finally, existing validation (e.g., correctness
of hash calculation, transaction validity) will be performed.
This work has some limitations at the current version. We
assume full nodes have consistent view as well as synchro-
nized time clock. Achieving a design with the same robustness
against various attacks without relying on these assumptions is
our immediate future work. Besides, we store all unconfirmed
tasks in the block, however the block size is limited to several
megabytes. This limits the total number of tasks that can
be handled by our blockchain. Breaking this limit is another
future work.
H. Properties of our blockchain
Synchronized tasks: The augmented mempool stores all unse-
lected tasks, and these mempools will be stored in every block.
Miners will have to select the task with the highest reward
from this list (that is available in the previous block), therefore
all miners are able to agree on the task to perform. Therefore,
full nodes are guaranteed to deal with the same task during
the block validation. We highlight that this synchronization is
achieved without relying on third-party entities, and therefore
it does not harm the decentralization of blockchain.
Redefining confirmation: Because of the way full nodes
choose the next block in our blockchain, whether blocks
can be reversed does not depend too much on the number
of confirmations (i.e., the number of blocks after them on
the blockchain). Rather, the accuracy of the models on the
blockchain determines it. Namely, if the block contains a
model with a high accuracy, it is challenging to generate
another block with another model with a higher accuracy.
Then, reversing the previous blocks ahead of the block with
a high-accuracy model requires the amount of work needed
for training a higher-accuracy model. Therefore, the blocks
become hardly reversible after there being multiple high-
accuracy models along the chain. Then, we may define the
confirmations of a block as the number of high-accuracy
models appearing after it rather than the number of blocks
after it.
Hardness of double spending: Full nodes will accept the
blocks in Phase 3 if and only if their headers are received in
Phase 1. Therefore, as long as full nodes are honest, even if
adversaries delay the submission of their blocks in order to
afford more time in training, they are not allowed to submit
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blocks with the better models (who were trained with more
time) because the block headers did not appear in Phase 1.
Even if the majority of the full nodes collude with miners,
double spending without 51% computing resources is still a
low-probability event. During the training process, the opti-
mization algorithms seek local optima with certain randomness
because no known algorithms can strategically find the global
optimum. Therefore, if only the highest-accuracy models are
accepted, it is challenging to further improve the accuracy
beyond it, as shown in Fig. 10,12. If adversaries wish to
double spend in our blockchain by controlling majority of
the full nodes, they must present another chain with more
highest-accuracy models. Because the accuracy of the model
depends on the hyperparameters and initial weights, choice of
which is random, we conjecture that it is extremely difficult to
generate another chain with more highest-accuracy models un-
less the adversary possesses more than 51% of the computing
resources for the image segmentation training.
Dataset and model provision: Training dataset may have
large volumes, however it is necessary for performing the
published tasks. Therefore, we assume the task publishers will
host training dataset for the miners’ access.
Besides, full nodes who need to verify the whole chain
(e.g., newly-joined full nodes) need to access the historical
models provided by the winning miners. We also let task
publishers store the image segmentation models they collected
from the miners, and provide the models to full nodes for their
verification. There may be model privacy concerns, however
addressing privacy concerns is an orthogonal problem, and we
do not address that in this paper.
In case the storage of models (100KB-10GB per model)
becomes a burden to the task publisher, we can save the storage
by freeing up some earlier models with lower accuracy because
the tamper-proofness is guaranteed by high-accuracy models
only. Accordingly, we can also let full nodes verify the high-
accuracy models only. By doing so, the blocks with high-
accuracy models will still prevent the double spending, and
the publishers need to store one model (the ultimate one that
has the highest accuracy) per task only.
Network delay: Unlike the existing work [32], blocks sub-
mitted to full nodes do not include the trained models any
more. Instead, the block contains the links providing access
to the models. Therefore blocks do not need to be very large.
Our blockchain does require some extra attributes in the block
header as well as various information of tasks in the block.
However, the storage burden of those extra data in the block
is negligible.
However, miners’ access to training data does involve non-
negligible network delay which owing to the characteristics of
the tasks performed by the miners. If tasks do not need to take
large data as input, miners will experience less extra network
delay.
Honesty of task publishers: Task publishers are assumed to
be honest in this paper, however this assumption can be relaxed
if we adopt smart contract capable of calling external APIs.
For example, if we have a function API_query(string
URL,string link) that sends the link of a model link to
a web-based API URL and returns its accuracy against the test
pragma solidity 0.4.0;
contract TaskContract {
uint256 private reward;
uint256 private accuracy;
string apiForTesting;
function TaskContract() public{
taskReward = 1 ether;
requiredAccuracy = 9500; // 95%
apiForTesting = xx.yy.com/test
}
function testAndPay(string linkOfModel) public{
require(API_query(apiForTesting, linkOfModel
) >= accuracy);
msg.sender.transfer(taskReward);
}
}
Fig. 8. A toy example of smart contract that guarantees task reward payment.
TABLE I
OVERHEAD BENCHMARK BASED ON 1000 TIMES TESTING
Model Digital signature (s) Network (s)AVG. STD. AVG. STD.
U-net (270MB) 1.25 0.051 3.77 0.322
FCN (212MB) 0.98 0.042 3.01 0.291
MNIST (2MB) 0.001 0.000 0.37 0.012
ARS (3MB) 0.002 0.000 0.41 0.001
dataset behind the API URL, we can let task publishers submit
and deploy a smart contract transaction that looks like Fig. 8.
It sends the task reward (1 ether) to the message sender if s/he
provides a link of well-trained model that yields a high-enough
accuracy (≥ 95%) after the API call to the publisher’s API for
testing (e.g., xx.yy.com/test). Then, we can let task publishers
announce their tasks by deploying smart contract transactions
at the blockchain instead of announcing them to full nodes. By
doing so, task publishers are unable to reject the task reward
payment. Oraclize [59] can be used to implement such external
API call in Ethereum-based smart contract transactions, which
supports access to any API on the Internet. However, further
study needs to be done to understand the security as well
as burden to the full nodes, the miners, and even the task
publishers.
V. EXPERIMENT
A. Experiment setup
The experiments were conducted in small scale local net-
work on the machines with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6850K CPU
@ 3.60GHz, 32Gb RAM, GTX 1080 Ti.
To exploit computation power of blookchain for the image
segmentation tasks, we adopt two widely used networks: fully
conventional networks (FCN) and U-net for for 2D and 3D
biomedical image segmentation respectively.
For FCN, we adopt the same network as that in the
work [60], a 34-layer FCN, which applied bottleneck design
and modified the decoding part to improve the accuracy. We
use the MICCAI 2015 Gland Challenge dataset which has 85
training 2D images and 80 test 2D images. The loss function,
learning rate, regulation parameters, and training epoch are
also the same as that in the work [60]. For U-net, we adopt
a general configurations: (a) four resolution steps, and each
resolution step contains two layers of 3 × 3 × 3 convolutions,
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Fig. 9. FCN image segmentation result. (The upper/lower row demonstrates
the segmentation results and original gland histology images, respectively.)
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Fig. 10. FCN Image segmentation accuracy results.
rectified linear unit (ReLu), and 2 × 2 × 2 max pooling/up-
sampling; (b) the number of filters in higher resolution step
doubles that in its lower resolution step, and the initial (lowest)
resolution step. We use the CT images in MMWHS 2017 heart
segmentation challenge which has 20 training 3D images and
40 test 3D images. The loss function, learning rate, regulation
parameters, and training epoch are the same as that in the
work [61]. For both the two networks, we use Dice metric for
evaluation.
B. Benchmark tests
Instead of the brute-force algorithm, the miner nodes per-
formed image segmentation tasks as described in Section V-A.
Fig. 9,11 shows the segmentation results with FCN method and
U-net method, respectively. The accuracy evaluation results
of FCN and U-net are demonstrated in Fig. 10,12. It can
be seen that additional training based on a well performed
model can hardly improve the performance of the model, thus
it will be prevented from double spending as the discussion
in Section IV-H.
Table I shows the extra overhead of digital signature and
network. The digital signature was achieved by SHA-256
Fig. 11. U-net image segmentation result. (The upper/lower row demonstrates
the segmentation results and original cardiac CT images, respectively.)
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Fig. 12. U-net Image segmentation accuracy results.
algorithm and the extra network overhead was evaluated by
transmitting the winner model through a local network in accu-
racy validation step. Both overheads are much smaller than the
image segmentation training time. Therefore, our mechanism
utilized most of power on useful tasks and it potentially could
be a contribution to both computer vision and blockchain
society. Since we assumed the dataset is public accessible,
the data loading time is not evaluated in the experiment. Extra
storage overhead incurred by augmented mempool and novel
task ledger is negligible which was discussed in Section IV-H.
C. Ownership protection evaluation
Full nodes will only accept a model if the watermark of the
submitted model matches the watermark of the co-responding
miner. Therefore, because of the embedded watermark in the
DL model, attacker will need to pay additional penalty in term
of removing the embedded watermark after the attacker miner
steals the winner DL models from honest miners.
In Fig 14, it shows the watermark confidence level for
honest miner and attacker miner. The honest miner achieved
very high watermark confidence level in less than 5 iterations.
But the attacker miner will have to remove the original
watermark first and it will cost around 30 iterations in our
case.
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Fig. 13. Confusion matrix for MNIST image classifier.
Fig. 14. Honest miner training versus attack miner training.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a blockchain design that lets
miners to perform biomedical image segmentation model
training instead of hash calculation for block mining. Our
blockchain design addresses the limitations of existing PoUW
consensus mechanisms. The useful work involved in our
design is practical because various disease diagnosis required
customized models trained on specific dataset. Our blockchain
is able to handle multiple tasks submitted by different task
publishers, and it also provides a solution to handle DNN mod-
els as well as training datasets with large size. We performed
quantitative experiments with real-world data to show that the
extra overhead introduced by our design is acceptable.
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